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This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is
no conﬂict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly.
The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information,
and then make the ex-post efﬁcient decision. The optimal committee size, k,
is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily
large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efﬁciently than
the committee of size k 2. This result implies that oversized committees gener-
ate only small inefﬁciencies.
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1. Introduction
The classical Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) states that large committees can aggregate
decentralized information more efﬁciently than small ones. Its origin can be traced to
the dawn of the French Revolution, when Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, mar-
quis de Condorcet (1785) investigated the decision-making processes in societies.1 Re-
cent literature on committee design has pointed out that if information acquisition is
costly, the CJT fails to hold. The reasoning is that if the size of a committee is large, a
committee member realizes that the probability that she can inﬂuence the ﬁnal deci-
sion is small compared to the cost of information acquisition. As a result, she might
prefer to avoid this cost and free-ride on the information of others. Therefore, large
committees might generate lower social welfare than small ones. These results suggest
that in the presence of costly information acquisition, optimally choosing the size of a
committee is both an important and delicate issue. In this paper, we characterize the
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welfare loss associated with oversized committees and show that this loss is surprisingly
small in certain environments. Therefore, as long as the committee size is large enough,
the careful design of a committee might not be as important as it was originally thought
to be. In fact, if either the information structure is ambiguous, or the committee has to
make decisions in various informational environments, it might be optimal to design
the committee to be as large as possible.
Committee design receives considerable attention from economists because, in
many situations, groups rather than individuals make decisions. Information about the
desirability of the possible decisions is often decentralized: individual group members
must separately acquire costly information about the alternatives. A classical example
is a jury trial where a jury has to decide whether a defendant is guilty or innocent. Each
juror individually obtains some information about the defendant, at some cost of ef-
fort (paying attention to the trial, investigating evidence, etc.). Likewise, when a ﬁrm is
facingthedecisionwhethertoimplementaproject, eachmemberoftheexecutivecom-
mittee can collect information about the proﬁtability of the project (by spending time
and exerting effort). Yet another example is the decision of an academic department to
hire a new member. Each member of the recruiting committee must review the appli-
cations individually before making a collective decision. What these examples have in
common is the fact that information acquisition is costly and often unobservable.
The exact setup analyzed in this paper is described as follows. A group of individ-
uals has to make a binary decision. There is no conﬂict of interest among the group
members, but they have imperfect information about which decision is best. First, k
individuals are asked to serve on a committee. Then the committee members simulta-
neously decide whether to invest in an informative signal. Finally, the committee makes
the optimal decision given the acquired information. We do not explicitly model how
the committee members communicate and aggregate information. Instead, we sim-
ply assume that they end up making the ex post efﬁcient decision.2 The only strategic
choice an individual must make in our model is whether to acquire a signal upon being
selected to serve on the committee.
The central question of our paper is the following: how does the committee size, k,
affect social welfare? First, for each k, we fully characterize the set of equilibria (includ-
ing asymmetric and mixed-strategy equilibria). We show that there exists kP (2N) such
that whenever k  kP, there is a unique equilibrium in which each committee member
invests in information with probability one. Furthermore, the social welfare generated
by these equilibria is an increasing function of k. If k > kP, then there are multiple
equilibria, many of which involve randomization by the members. We show also that
the social welfare generated by the worst equilibrium in the game, where the commit-
tee size is k, is decreasing in k if k > kP. The optimal committee size k is deﬁned
as the smallest committee size such that there is an equilibrium in the committee with
k members that maximizes social welfare among all equilibria in any committee. We
2Since there is no conﬂict of interest among the individuals, it is easy to design a mechanism that is
incentivecompatibleandefﬁcientlyaggregatesthesignals. Alternatively,onecanassumethatthecollected
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prove that the optimal committee size is either kP or kP +1. This implies that the CJT
fails to hold: large committees can generate smaller social welfare than small commit-
tees. We show, nevertheless, that if the size of the committee is larger than k, even the
worst equilibrium generates higher social welfare than the unique equilibrium in the
committee of size k 2. That is, the welfare loss due to an oversized committee is quite
small. For our results to hold, we need an assumption on the distribution of the signals.
This assumption, stated formally in the next section, requires the marginal beneﬁt from
a signal to decrease fast.
Literature Review
Although the Condorcet Jury Theorem provides important support for the basis of
democratic decision making, many of the premises of the theorem have been criticized.
Perhaps most importantly, Condorcet assumes sincere voting. That is, each individual
votes as if she were the only voter in the society. This means that an individual votes for
the alternative that is best, conditional on her signal. Austen-Smith and Banks (1996)
show that in general, sincere voting is not consistent with equilibrium behavior. This is
because a rational individual votes conditional not only on her signal, but also on her
beingpivotal. FeddersenandPesendorfer(1998)showthatasthejurysizeincreases,the
probability of convicting an innocent can actually increase under unanimity rule.
A variety of papers show, however, that even if the voters are strategic, in certain
environments the outcome of voting converges to the efﬁcient outcome as the number
ofvotersgoestoinﬁnity. FeddersenandPesendorfer(1997)investigateamodelinwhich
preferences are heterogeneous and each voter has a private signal concerning which
alternative is best. They construct an equilibrium for each population size, such that
the equilibrium outcome converges to the full information outcome as the number of
voters goes to inﬁnity. The full information outcome is deﬁned as the result of a voting
game where all information is public. Myerson (1998) shows that asymptotic efﬁciency
can be achieved even if there is population uncertainty; that is, if a voter does not know
how many other voters there are.
In contrast, the Condorcet Jury Theorem might fail to hold if the information acqui-
sition is costly. Mukhopadhaya (2003) considers a model similar to ours where voters
have identical preferences, but information acquisition is costly. He shows by numer-
ical examples that mixed-strategy equilibria in large committees may generate lower
expected welfare than pure-strategy equilibria in small committees.3
Martinelli (2006) also introduces a cost of information acquisition into a model
where signals are binary. He allows the precision of the signals to depend continuously
on the amount of investment and proves that if the cost and the marginal cost of the
precision are zero at the zero level of precision, then the decision is asymptotically ef-
ﬁcient. More precisely, if the size of the committee converges to inﬁnity, then there is
3The results are quite different if the voting, rather than the information acquisition, is costly: see e.g.
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a sequence of symmetric equilibria in which each member invests only a little, and the
probability of a correct decision converges to one.4
We think that Martinelli (2006) contributes substantially towards the understanding
of the efﬁciency properties of group decision making when there is no ﬁxed cost asso-
ciated with information acquisition. However, we believe that the existence of a ﬁxed
cost is an essential feature of many environments. Indeed, one has to pay the price of a
newspaper, even if it will be thrown away later. The management of a company has to
pay for a consultant, even if the consultant’s work will be completely ignored. Similarly,
a juror has to sit through a trial, even if he decides not to pay any attention. What these
examples have in common is that a positive cost must be invested in the signals even if
the precision is zero. These examples also suggest that exerting more effort might lead
to more accurate information, though this is not modeled in our paper. Hence, we think
thattheresultinourpaperisanimportantcomplementtoMartinelli(2006). Ifinforma-
tion acquisition has ﬁxed as well as variable costs, then an asymptotic efﬁciency result,
like the one in Martinelli (2006), does not hold. However, we conjecture that our result
is still valid in some form. That is, the efﬁciency loss due to large committees is small.5
Numerous papers analyze the optimal decision rules in the presence of costly in-
formation. Persico (2004) discusses the relationship between the optimal decision rules
and the accuracy of the signals. He shows that a voting rule that requires a strong con-
sensusinordertoupsetthestatusquoisoptimalonlyifthesignalsaresufﬁcientlyaccu-
rate. The intuition for the extreme case, where the decision rule is unanimity rule, is the
following. Under unanimity rule, the probability of being pivotal is small. However, this
probability increases as the signals become more accurate. Therefore, in order to pro-
vide a voter with an incentive to invest in information, the signals must be sufﬁciently
accurate.
Li (2001), Gerardi and Yariv (2008), and Gershkov and Szentes (forthcoming) show
that the optimal voting mechanism sometimes involves ex post inefﬁcient decisions.
That is, the optimal mechanism might specify inefﬁcient decisions for certain signal
proﬁles. We believe that in many situations such a commitment device is not available,
which is why we simply restrict attention to ex post efﬁcient decision rules. We believe
that this is the appropriate assumption in the context of a deliberating committee in
which there is no conﬂict of interest among individuals.
Section 2 describes the model. The main theorems are stated and proved in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 concludes. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model
There is a population consisting of N (> 1) individuals. The state of the world, !, can
take one of two values, 1 and  1, with Pr[! = 1] =  2 (0,1). The society must make a
4In his accompanying paper, Martinelli (2007) analyzes a model in which information has a ﬁxed cost,
votersareheterogeneousintheircosts,andabstentionisnotallowed. Heshowsthatif,ontheonehand,the
support of the cost distribution is not bounded away from zero, asymptotic efﬁciency can be achieved. If,
on the other hand, the cost is bounded away from zero, and the number of voters is large, nobody acquires
information in any equilibrium.
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decision, d, which is either 1 or  1. There is no conﬂict of interest among individuals.
Eachindividualhasabeneﬁtofu(d,!)ifdecisiond ismadewhenthestateoftheworld





0 if d =!
 q if d = 1 and !=1
 (1 q) if d =1 and != 1,
where q (2 (0,1)), indicates the severity of a type-I error.6 Each individual can purchase
a signal at a cost c (> 0) at most once. Signals are iid across individuals, conditional on
the realization of the state of the world. The ex post payoff of an individual who invests
in information is u  c. Each individual maximizes her expected payoff.
There are two stages of the decision-making process. At Stage 1, k ( N) mem-
bers of the society are designated at random to serve on a committee. At Stage 2, the
committee members decide simultaneously and independently whether or not to in-
vest in information. Then, the efﬁcient decision is made given the signals collected by
the members.
We do not model explicitly how committee members deliberate at Stage 2. Since
there isno conﬂict of interestamong the members, itis easy to designa communication
protocol that efﬁciently aggregates information. Alternatively, one can assume that the
acquired information is hard. Hence, no communication is necessary for making the
ex post efﬁcient decision. We focus merely on the committee members’ incentives to
acquire information.
Next, we turn to the deﬁnition of social welfare. First, let  denote the ex post efﬁ-
cient decision rule. That is,  is a mapping from sets of signals into possible decisions.
If the signal proﬁle is (s1,...,sn), where n is the number of signals acquired, then
(s1,...,sn)=1,E![u(1,!)js1,...,sn]E![u( 1,!)js1,...,sn].
Social welfare is measured by the expected sum of the payoffs of the individuals,
Es1,...,sn,![Nu((s1,...,sn),!) cn],
where the expectation also takes into account possible randomization by the individu-
als. That is, n can be a random variable.
Ifthecommitteeislarge,thenamembermightprefertosavethecostofinformation
acquisition and choose to rely on the opinions of others. By contrast, if k is too small,
there is too little information to aggregate, and thus the ﬁnal decision is likely to be in-
efﬁcient. The questions are: What value of k maximizes ex-ante social welfare? How big
is the welfare loss in sub-optimal committees? Next, we deﬁne the optimal committee
size formally.
6In the jury context, where ! = 1 corresponds to the innocence of the suspect, q indicates the severity
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Definition. The optimal size of the committee is the smallest committee size k (2 N)
such that there is an equilibrium in the committee with k members that maximizes
social welfare among all equilibria in any committee.
In our model, the optimal committee size is k if (i) there is an equilibrium in the
committee with k members that maximizes social welfare among all equilibria in any
committee, and (ii) each member acquires information with positive probability in this
equilibrium. This is because a member who does not invest in information can be elim-
inated from the committee without changing the incentives of the other members.
We compute social welfare in all equilibria in suboptimal committees and compare
the welfare loss in these committees. Since the signals are iid conditional on the state of
the world, the expected beneﬁt of an individual from the ex post efﬁcient decision is a
function of the number of signals acquired. We deﬁne this function as follows:
(n)=Es1,...,sn,![u((s1,...,sn),!)].
We assume that the signals are informative about the state of the world, but only imper-
fectly so. That is, as the number of signals goes to inﬁnity, the probability of making the
correct decision is strictly increasing and converges to one. Formally, the function  is
strictly increasingand limn!1(n)=0. An individual’s marginalbeneﬁt from collecting
an additional signal, when n signals are already obtained, is
g(n)=(n +1) (n).
Note that limn!1 g(n) = 0. For our main theorem to hold, we need the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 1. The function g is log-convex.7 That is, g(n +1)=g(n) is increasing in n
(2N).
Whether or not this assumption is satisﬁed depends only on the primitives of the
model—that is, on the distribution of the signals and on the parameters q and . An
immediate consequence of the assumption is the following.
Remark 1. The function g is decreasing.
Proof. Supposetothecontrarythatthereexistsanintegern0 2Nsuchthat g(n0+1)>
g(n0). Since g(n +1)=g(n) is increasing in n, it follows that g(n +1) > g(n) whenever
n  n0. Hence g(n) > g(n0) > 0 whenever n > n0. This implies that limn!1 g(n) 6= 0,
which is a contradiction. 
Next, we explain that Assumption 1 essentially means that the marginal value of a
signal decreases rapidly. Notice that the function g being decreasing means that the
7The standard deﬁnition of convex functions requires the functions to have convex domains. This def-
inition, however, can be naturally extended to functions with non-convex domains by requiring the con-
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marginal social value of an additional signal is decreasing. We think that this assump-
tion is satisﬁed in most economic and political applications. How much more does As-
sumption 1 require? Since g is decreasing and limn!1 g(n) = 0, there always exists
an increasing sequence fnmg1
m=1  N such that g(nm)  g(nm +1) is decreasing in m.
Hence, it is still natural to restrict attention to information structures where the sec-
ond difference in the social value of a signal, g(n)  g(n +1), is decreasing. Recall that
Assumption 1 is equivalent to (g(n) g(n +1))=g(n) being decreasing. That is, Assump-
tion 1 requires that the second difference in the value of a signal not only decreases, but
does so at an increasing rate.
In general, it is hard to check whether this assumption holds because it is often dif-
ﬁcult (or impossible) to express g(n) analytically. The next section provides examples
where the assumption is satisﬁed.
2.1 Examples for the log-convexity assumption
First, suppose that the signals are normally distributed around the true state of the
world. The log-convexity assumption is satisﬁed for the model where +q = 1. That
is, the society would be indifferent between the two possible decisions if information
acquisition were impossible. The assumption is also satisﬁed even if +q 6= 1, if the
signals are sufﬁciently precise. Formally, we have the following result, which, like the
other results in this section, is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Suppose that si N(!,).
(i) If q +=1 then Assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
(ii) For all q, , there exists "q, >0 such that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed if "q, >.
In our next example the signal is ternary—that is, its possible values are f 1,0,1g. In
addition,
Pr(si =!j!)=pr, Pr(si =0j!)=1 r, and Pr(si = !j!)=(1 p)r.
Notice that r (2 (0,1)) is the probability that the realization of the signal is informative,
and p is the precision of the signal conditional on being informative.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the signal is ternary. Then for any r(2 (0,1)) there exists a
threshold p(r)2(0,1) such that if p >p(r), Assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
Next, we provide an example where the log-convexity assumption is not satisﬁed.
Suppose that the signal is binary—that is, si 2f 1,1g and
Pr(si =!j!)=p, Pr(si = !j!)=1 p.234 Koriyama and Szentes Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
Proposition 3. If the signal is binary then Assumption 1 is not satisﬁed.
Since binary signals are commonly assumed in the literature on committee design,
we further explain the negative result in Proposition 3. For simplicity, assume that the
prior is symmetric. In this case, the ex post optimal decision after receiving a set of
signals is 1 if and only if there are (weakly) more signals 1 in the set than signals  1.
The marginal social value of a signal can be positive only if the ex post optimal decision
is different from the one without this signal with positive probability. This can happen
only if there are as many signals 1 as signals  1 prior to receiving the additional signal,
and in particular, if the number of signals is even. This implies that the marginal social
values of the second, fourth, sixth, etc. signals are all zero. Hence, the function g is not
even decreasing.
Notice that in this example, even if the cost of information is zero there always ex-
ists an equilibrium in which only one individual obtains a signal. Indeed, if an individ-
ual knows that there is exactly one signal collected by the others, he has no incentive
to invest in information because he cannot have any effect on the optimality of the ﬁ-
nal decision. This argument is due to the fact that each signal realization has the same
strength. Were an individual to know that his signal would be potentially very informa-
tive, he would invest if the cost is low enough, because, at least with small probability,
his information induces a more informative decision.
Most of the literature assumes that committee members aggregate information by
a binary voting procedure where members vote either yes or no (or abstain). Assuming
binary signals in this case is perhaps less problematic because even if a member has a
strong signal he cannot communicate it via his vote. We believe, however, that allow-
ing variation in the strength of the signals is an important and realistic feature of the
world. Allowing, for example, that a juror leans slightly towards a guilty verdict and at
thesametimeanotherjurorissurethatthedefendantisinnocentmighthaveimportant
consequences. We believe also that even if there is binary voting at the end of the delib-
eration, committee members are able to communicate their information to the others,
at least partially. Focusing on the deliberation might be more important than analyzing
the voting game.
3. Results
This section is devoted to our main theorems. We ﬁrst characterize the set of equilibria
for all k (2 N). The next subsection shows that if k is small, the equilibrium is unique,
and each member incurs the cost of information (Proposition 4). Section 3.2 describes
the set of mixed-strategy equilibria for sufﬁciently large k (Proposition 5). Finally, Sec-
tion 3.3 states and proves the main results (Theorems 1 and 2).
3.1 Pure-strategy equilibrium
Suppose that the size of the committee is k. If the ﬁrst k  1 members acquire informa-
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is willing to invest if this gain exceeds the cost of the signal; that is, if
c < g(k  1). (1)
This inequality is the incentive compatibility constraint that guarantees that a commit-
tee member is willing to invest in information if the size of the committee is k.8
Proposition 4. Let k denotethesizeofthecommittee. Thereexists kP 2Nsuchthatthere
exists a unique equilibrium in which each member invests in a signal with probability
one if and only if k  minfkP,Ng. Furthermore, the social welfare generated by these
equilibria is monotonically increasing in k (minfkP,Ng).
Proof. Recall from Remark 1 that g is decreasing and limk!1 g(k) = 0. Therefore, for
any positive cost9 c < g(0), there exists a unique kP 2N such that
g(kP)<c < g(kP  1). (2)
First,weshowthatifk kP thenthereisauniqueequilibriuminwhicheachcommittee
member invests in information. Suppose that in an equilibrium, the ﬁrst k  1 members
randomize according to the proﬁle (r1,...,rk 1), where ri 2[0,1] denotes the probability
that the ith member invests. Let I denote the number of signals collected by the ﬁrst
k   1 members. Since the members randomize, I is a random variable. Notice that
I k  1 and
Er1,...,rk 1[g(I)] g(k  1)
because g is decreasing. Notice also that from k kP and (2), it follows that
g(k  1)>c.
Combining the previous two inequalities, we get
Er1,...,rk 1[g(I)]>c.
This inequality implies that no matter what the strategies of the ﬁrst k  1 members are,
the kth member strictly prefers to invest in information. From this observation, the ex-
istence and uniqueness of the pure-strategy equilibrium follow. It remains to show that
if k > kP, such a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist. If k > kP, then g(k  1)<c.
Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint, (1), is violated, and there is no equi-
librium where each member incurs the cost of the signal.
Finally, we must show that the social welfare generated by these pure-strategy equi-
libria is increasing in k (minfkP,Ng). Notice that since N >1,
c < g(k  1)=(k) (k  1)<N((k) (k  1)).
8In what follows, we ignore the case where there exists k 2 N such that c = g(k). This equality does not
hold generically, and would have no effect on our results.
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Figure 1. Expected gain g(k) and the cost c.
After adding N(k  1) ck, we get
N(k  1) c(k  1)<N(k) ck.
The left-hand side is the social welfare generated by the equilibrium in a committee
of size k  1, while the right-hand side is the social welfare induced by a committee of
size k. 
Figure 1 is the graph of g(k) and c when si  N(!,1),  = .3, q = .7, and c = 10 4.
The expected gain is decreasing and log-convex. In this example, kP =11.
The amount of information purchased in any equilibrium is inefﬁciently small. This
is because when a committee member decides whether or not to invest, she considers
her private beneﬁt rather than the society’s beneﬁt. Since information is a public good,
its social beneﬁt is bigger than its individual beneﬁt. Hence, the total number of signals
acquired in an equilibrium is smaller than the socially optimal number. This is why the
social welfare is monotonically increasing in the committee size k as long as k kP.
Mukhopadhaya (2003) has proved a result that corresponds to the statement of
Proposition 4 for the case where the signals are binary. He has also shown by numerical
examples that mixed-strategy equilibria can yield lower expected welfare in large com-
mittees than in small committees. Our analysis goes further by analytically comparing
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3.2 Mixed-strategy equilibrium
Suppose now that the size of the committee is larger than kP. We consider strategy pro-
ﬁles in which the committee members can randomize when making a decision about
incurring the cost of information acquisition. The following proposition characterizes
the set of mixed-strategy equilibria (including asymmetric ones).
We show that each equilibrium is characterized by a pair of integers (a,b). In the
committee, a members invest in a signal with probability one and b members acquire
information with a positive probability that is less than one. The rest of the members,
k  (a +b) in number, do not incur the cost. We call such an equilibrium a type-(a,b)
equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Let the committee size be k (> kP). There exists an equilibrium where
a members invest for sure, b members invest with probability r 2 (0,1), and k  (a +b)
members do not invest, if and only if
a kP a +b k, (3)
where the ﬁrst two inequalities are strict whenever b >0.
Proof. First, we explain that if, in an equilibrium in which one member invests with
probability r1 2 (0,1) and another invests with probability r2 2 (0,1), then r1 = r2. Since
the marginal beneﬁt from an additional signal is decreasing, our games exhibit strate-
gic substitution. That is, the more information the others acquire, the less incentive a
member has to invest. Hence, if r1 < r2, then the individual who invests with proba-
bility r1 faces more information in expectation and has less incentive to invest than the
individual who invests with probability r2. On the other hand, since r1,r2 2 (0,1), both
individuals must be exactly indifferent between investing and not investing, a contra-
diction. Now, we formalize this argument. Let ri 2 [0,1] (i = 1,...,k) be the probability
that the ith member collects information in an equilibrium. Suppose that r1, r2 2 (0,1)
andr1 >r2. Let I 1 and I 2 denotethenumberofsignalscollectedbymembers2,3,...,k
and by members 1,3,...,k, respectively. Notice that since r1 >r2 and g is decreasing,
Er2,r3,...,rk[g(I 1)]>Er1,r3,...,rk[g(I 2)]. (4)
On the other hand, a member who strictly randomizes must be indifferent between in-
vesting and not investing. Hence, for j =1,2,
Erj,r3,...,rk[g(I j)]=c.
This equality implies that (4) should hold with equality, which is a contradiction. There-
fore, each equilibrium can be characterized by a pair (a,b) where a members collect
information for sure and b members randomize but collect information with the same
probability.
It remains to show that there exists a type-(a,b) equilibrium if and only if (a,b) sat-
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invest with probability one and the remaining members never invest. In addition, the
pair (kP,0) satisﬁes (3). Therefore, we have to show only that there exists an equilibrium
of type-(a,b) where b >0 if and only if (a,b) satisﬁes
a <kP <a +b k. (5)
Suppose that a members invest in information for sure and b  1 invest with prob-
ability r. Let G(r;a,b) denote the expected gain from acquiring information for the









We claim that there exists a type-(a,b) equilibrium if and only if there exists r 2 (0,1)
such thatG(r;a,b) = c. Suppose ﬁrst that such an r exists. We ﬁrst argue that there ex-
ists a type-(a,b) equilibrium in which b members invest with probability r. This means
thattheb members, whoarerandomizing, areindifferentbetweeninvestingandnotin-
vesting. Thea memberswhoinvestforsurestrictlyprefertoinvestbecausethemarginal
gain from an additional signal exceeds G(r;a,b). Similarly, those members who do not
invest,whonumberk (a+b),arestrictlybetteroffnotinvestingbecausetheirmarginal
gains are strictly smaller than G(r;a,b). Next, we argue that if G(r;a,b) = c does not
have a solution in (0,1), then there exists no type-(a,b) equilibrium. This immediately
follows from the observation that if b members are strictly randomizing, they must be
indifferent between investing and not investing, and hence G(r;a,b) = c. Therefore, it
is sufﬁcient to show thatG(r;a,b)=c has a solution in (0,1) if and only if (5) holds.
Notice thatG(r;a,b) is strictly decreasing in r because g is strictly decreasing. Also
observe that G(0;a,b) = g(a) and G(1;a,b) = g(a +b  1). By the Intermediate Value
Theorem, G(r;a,b) = c has a solution in (0,1) if and only if G(1;a,b) < c < G(0;a,b),
which is equivalent to
g(a +b  1)<c < g(a). (6)
Recall that kP satisﬁes
g(kP)<c < g(kP  1).
Since g is decreasing, (6) holds if and only if a < kP and a +b > kP. That is, the two
strict inequalities in (5) are satisﬁed. The last inequality in (5) must hold because a +b
cannot exceed the size of the committee, k. 
Figure 2 graphically represents the set of pairs (a,b) that satisfy (3).
According to the previous proposition, there are several equilibria in which more
than kP members acquire information with positive probability. A natural question to
ask is: can these mixed-strategy equilibria be compared from the point of view of so-
cial welfare? The next proposition partially answers this question. We show that if one
ﬁxes the number of members who acquire information for sure, then as the number of
randomizing members increases, the social welfare generated by the equilibrium de-
creases. This proposition plays an important role in determining the optimal size of the
committee.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem 239
a
b
k k P −1 k P k P +1
k P +1
k
Figure 2. The set of mixed-strategy equilibria.
Proposition 6. Suppose that k 2 N is such that there are both type-(a,b) and type-
(a,b +1) equilibria. Then the type-(a,b) equilibrium generates strictly higher social wel-
fare than the type-(a,b +1) equilibrium.
In order to prove this proposition we need the following result, which is proved in
the Appendix.
Lemma 1. (i) G(r;a,b)>G(r;a,b +1) for all r 2(0,1].
(ii) ra,b > ra,b+1, where ra,b and ra,b+1 are the solutions for r of G(r;a,b) = c and
G(r;a,b +1)=c respectively.
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that a members collect information with probabil-
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(a +i +1) (a +i)
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Next, we show that
f (ra,b;a,b)  f (ra,b+1;a,b +1)>b(ra,b  ra,b+1)c. (7)
Since f (0;a,b)= f (0;a,b +1)=(a),
f (ra,b;a,b)  f (ra,b+1;a,b +1)
=

























By part (ii) of the lemma, we know that ra,b+1 < ra,b. In addition, since G is decreasing
in r, this last expression is larger than
b(ra,b  ra,b+1)G(ra,b;a,b).
Recall that ra,b is deﬁned such thatG(ra,b;a,b)=c and hence we can conclude (7).
LetS(a,b) denote the social welfare in the type-(a,b) equilibrium; that is,
S(a,b)=N f (ra,b;a,b) c(a +bra,b).
Then
S(a,b) S(a,b +1)=N f (ra,b;a,b) c(a +bra,b) [N f (ra,b+1;a,b +1) c(a +bra,b+1)]
>Nb(ra,b  ra,b+1)c  cb(ra,b  ra,b+1)
=(N  1)cb(ra,b  ra,b+1)>0,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from (7), and the last one follows from part (ii) of
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3.3 The main theorems
First, we show that the optimal committee size is either kP or kP +1. Second, we prove
that if k >k, then even the worst possible equilibrium yields higher social welfare than
the unique equilibrium in the committee of size k  2.
Theorem 1. The optimal committee size, k, is either kP or kP +1.
We emphasize that for a certain set of parameter values, the optimal size is k = kP,
and for another set, k =kP +1.
Proof. Suppose that k is the optimal size of the committee and the equilibrium that
maximizes social welfare is of type-(a,b). By the deﬁnition of optimal size, a +b = k.
If b = 0, then all of the committee members invest in information in this equilibrium.
From Proposition 4, k  kP follows. In addition, Proposition 4 states that the social
welfare is increasing in k as long as k  kP. Therefore, k = kP follows. Suppose now
that b > 0. If there exists an equilibrium of type-(a,b   1), then, by Proposition 6, k
is not the optimal committee size. Hence if the size of the committee is k, there does
not exist an equilibrium of type-(a,b  1). By Proposition 5, this implies that the pair
(a,b  1) violates the inequality chain (3) with k =k. Since the ﬁrst and last inequalities
in (3) hold because there is a type-(a,b) equilibrium, it must be the case that the second
inequality is violated. That is, kP  a +b  1 = k  1. This implies that k  kP +1.
Again, from Proposition 4, it follows that k =kP or kP +1. 
Next,weturnourattentiontothepotentialwelfarelossduetooversizedcommittees.
Theorem 2. In any committee of size k (>k), all equilibria induce higher social welfare
than the unique equilibrium in the committee of size k  2.
The following lemma plays an important role in the proof. We point out that the
proof of this lemma is the only place where we use the log-convexity assumption (As-
sumption 1). For our previous results, we need the function g only to be decreasing,
which is a consequence of Assumption 1.
Lemma 2. For all k 1 and i 2N,
g(k  1)fg(i)  g(k)gfg(k)  g(k  1)gf(i) (k)g, (8)
with equality if and only if i =k or k  1.
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall thatS(a,b) denotes the expected social welfare generated
by an equilibrium of type-(a,b). Using this notation, we have to prove thatS(k 2,0)<
S(a,b). From Theorem 1, we know that k =kP or kP +1. By Proposition 4,S(kP  2,0)<
S(kP 1,0). Therefore, inordertoestablishS(k 2,0)<S(a,b), itisenoughtoshowthat
S(kP  1,0)<S(a,b) (9)
for all pairs of (a,b) that satisfy (3).242 Koriyama and Szentes Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)

















































i(1 ra,b)b ii =bra,b. Therefore, (9)
















































The left-hand side is the payoff of an individual if kP   1 signals are acquired by oth-
ers, while the right-hand side is the payoff of an individual who is randomizing in a























































a,b(1 ra,b)b 1 ig(a +i)=c < g(kP  1), (13)
wheretheequalityguaranteesthatamemberwhoisrandomizingisindifferentbetween
investing and not investing, and the inequality holds by (2). Hence from (12) and (13),

























Finally, since (kP)  g(kP  1)=(kP  1), this inequality is just (11). 
The two graphs of Figure 3 show the social welfare in the worst equilibrium as a
function of the committee size for an example. In the example, the prior is symmetric,
and the parameters are N = 100, si  N(!,1),  = .3, p = .7, and c = 10 4. In this case
we have kP = 11, and k = 12. The two graphs are the same except that the scalings of
the vertical axes differ. One can see that the welfare loss due to oversized committees is
quite small.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the optimal committee size and the potential welfare losses
associated with oversized committees. We focus on environments in which there is no
conﬂict of interest among individuals, but information acquisition is costly. First, we
conﬁrmthattheoptimalcommitteesizeisbounded. Inotherwords, theCondorcetJury
Theorem fails to hold: larger committees might induce smaller social welfare. However,
we show also that the welfare loss due to oversized committees is surprisingly small. In
anarbitrarilylargecommittee,eventheworstequilibriumgenerateswelfarehigherthan
doesanequilibriuminacommitteewithtwolessmembersthantheoptimalcommittee.
Our results suggest that carefully designing committees might be not as important as
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Figure3. Socialwelfareasafunctionofthecommitteesizek forN =100, =0.3,q =0.7,  =1,
c =0.0001) kP =11, k =12.
Appendix
Lemma 3. Supposethat (2C1(R+))isabsolutelycontinuousandstrictlyincreasing,and
0(k +1)=0(k) is strictly increasing for k > ", where "  0. Let g(k) = (k +1) (k) for
all k 0. Then g(k +1)=g(k)< g(k +2)=g(k +1) for k ".
Proof. Fix k ( "). Notice that 0(k +2)=0(k +1) < 0(t +2)=0(t +1) is equivalent to



















Similarly, for all t 2 (k,k + 1), 0(k + 2)=0(k + 1) > 0(t + 1)=0(t) is equivalent to

























for all k ". 
Proof of Proposition 1. The sum of normally distributed signals is also normal: Pk
i=1si N(!k,
p
k). The density function of
Pk














where (x)=(2) 1=2exp( x2=2). The ex post efﬁcient decision rule is given by
(s1,...,sk)=
(
1 if s1 ++sk 
 1 if s1 ++sk <,

























where  is the cdf of standard normal distribution. If k =0,
(0)=maxf q, (1 q)(1 )g. (17)
Notice that the right-hand side of (16) converges to that of (17) as k goes to zero.

































is increasing in k (>0). From Lemma 3, setting " to be zero, it follows that g(k +1)=g(k)
is increasing in k 2N.























































Next, we argue that for any " (> 0), 0(k + 1)=0(k) is increasing for all k > " if  is


































































where L =logf(1 q)(1 )=(q)g. Now suppose that k >". The last term in (18) has no
inﬂuence on whether 0(k +1)=0(k) is increasing. The second term converges to 1 as
 goes to 0. Obviously, the ﬁrst term is strictly increasing in k. Hence, 0(k +1)=0(k) is
increasing in k (>") if  is sufﬁciently small. By setting " 2(0,1) and using Lemma 3, we
have shown that g(k +1)=g(k)< g(k +2)=g(k +1) for all k 1.
It remains to show that g(1)=g(0) < g(2)=g(1). From the argument in the proof of
Lemma 3, it follows that 0(2)=0(1)<0(t +1)=0(t) for all t 2(1,2) implies 0(2)=0(1)<
g(2)=g(1). Hence it is enough to show that g(1)=g(0) < 0(2)=0(1) for sufﬁciently small
. Since lim!0 g(0) =  (0) > 0, it is enough to show that lim!0[g(1)=f0(2)=0(1)g] =





=0 for k 2f1,2g. (19)
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which implies (k) 2 OE(( 
p
k=)) as  ! 0.10 Using (18), 0(2)=0(1) 2





















which implies (19). 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, we claim that the ex post efﬁcient decision rule





i=1si  b ,
 1 if
Pk
i=1si < b ,
(20)
where b  = log[(1   q)(1   )=q]=log[p=(1   p)]. Suppose that the signal sequence
(s1,...,sk) is a permutation of

1,...,1 | {z }
a
,0,...,0 | {z }
k a b


























 = b .
Since
Pk
i=1si =a  b, (20) follows.
Now we consider the case where p converges to 1. Let " denote 1 p and let Pr[a,b]
denote the probability of a signal sequence that is a permutation of (21). Then
Pr[a,b j!=1]=Ck(a,b)(1 ")a"b
Pr[a,b j!= 1]=Ck(a,b)(1 ")b"a,
10OE is a version of Landau’s O, which describes the exact order of the expression. Formally, f (x) 2
OE(g(x)) as x !a if and only if there exists M >0 such that limx!a jf (x)=g(x)j=M.248 Koriyama and Szentes Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
where Ck(a,b) = [k!=(a!b!(k  a  b)!)]ra+b(1 r)k a b.11 Notice that Ck(a,b) is inde-
pendent of " and symmetric with respect to a and b. We have12
Pr[a  b  1j!=1]=Ck(0,1)"+O("2)
Pr[a  b 0j!= 1]=Ck(0,0)+fCk(1,0)+Ck(1,1)g"+O("2).
Observe that jb j < 1 if p is close enough to one. Without loss of generality, assume
that q +1. Then  1< b  0. Hence









































We want to show that g(k + 1)=g(k) is increasing in k if " is sufﬁciently small. Since
A(k +1)=A(k)=1 r, it is sufﬁcient to show that B(k)=A(k) is convex in k. It is straight-











is a polynomial of k with degree 1, hence it has no inﬂuence on the convexity of








has a positive coefﬁcient of k2. Hence we conclude that B(k)=A(k) is convex in k. 
11Deﬁne Ck(a,b)=0 if k <a +b.
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Proof of Proposition 3. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the ex post efﬁcient decision







where  = log[(1  q)(1   )=q]=log[p=(1   p)]. By symmetry, we can assume   0
without loss of generality. First, suppose  > 1. Then (k) =  q for k < , and the
marginalbeneﬁtfromanadditionalsignaliszerofork < 1. Therefore g(k+1)=g(k)is
notwell-deﬁned. Second,suppose0 <1. Weconsidertwodifferentcasesdepending
on whether k is even or odd.
Case 1: Suppose k = 2m, where m 2 N. Then the (2m + 1)-st signal makes a dif-
ference if and only if m of the ﬁrst 2m signals are positive and m are negative, and the
(2m +1)-st signal is positive (denote this situation as pive). In such a case, the social de-
cision changes from  1 to 1. Hence the gain isq if !=1 and the loss is (1 q) if != 1.


























Case 2: Suppose k = 2m +1, where m 2 N. Then the (2m +2)-nd signal makes a
difference if and only if the ﬁrst 2m +1 signals contain m +1 positive and m negative
signals and the (2m +2)-nd signal is negative (denote this situation as pivo). In such a
case, the social decision changes from 1 to  1. Hence the loss is q if !=1, and the gain


























Recall that 0   < 1, which is equivalent to pq   (1   p)(1   q)(1   ) > 0 and







which is a constant function of m, so that Assumption 1 does not hold. If  = 0, then
g(2m +1)=0 and g(2m +2)=g(2m +1) is not well-deﬁned. 250 Koriyama and Szentes Theoretical Economics 4 (2009)
































































where the ﬁrst equality holds because we have just redeﬁned the notation in the second






























(ii). By the deﬁnitions of ra,b and ra,b+1, we have
c =G(ra,b;a,b)=G(ra,b+1;a,b +1),




SinceG(r;a,b) is strictly decreasing in r, ra,b >ra,b+1 follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The statement of the lemma is obvious if i 2 fk  1,kg. It remains
to show that (8) holds with strict inequality whenever i = 2fk  1,kg. First, notice that for
any positive sequence fa jg1








for all k >1 and for all i 2f0,...,k  2g.Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem 251












for all i 2f0,...,k  2g.
Since (a)>(b) if a >b, this implies that for all i 2f0,...,k  2g,
g(k)[(i) (k)]< g(k  1)[(i +1) (k +1)]. (22)
Similarly, for a positive sequence fa jg1








for all k 1 and for all i k +1.











for all i >k.
Multiplying through by g(k  1)((i) (k)), we get (22). That is, (22) holds whenever
i = 2fk  1,kg. After subtracting g(k  1)((i) (k)) from both sides of (22), we get (8). 
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